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INTRODUCTION
There is a saying that "people get the government they vote for." The impli-
cation of the maxim is that if undesirable or unwise legislation is enacted, if ex-
ecutive branch officials are inept or ineffective, or if the government is beset
with widespread corruption, then such unfortunate results are the consequence
of the electorate's decision regarding whom to trust with the powers and pres-
tige of public office. The Constitution does not forbid people from enacting
wrongheaded policies. If voters elect leaders that fail them, then the citizenry is
saddled with the consequences of its choice until the next election. Such is the
reality in a democratic republic.
But this argument begs the question of whether voters did in fact elect the
individuals who take their oaths of office. How do citizens know which candi-
date actually won in any given election? Election results are legitimate only to
the extent that the returns include every legal vote-and only those legal
votes-undiluted by fraudulent or otherwise unacceptable votes. The task of
counting every legal ballot and excluding every unlawful one is the challenge
faced by practitioners of election law, whether as lawyers or as election officials.
Primary authority for elections in America rests with the states, and in each ju-
risdiction the secretary of state is the senior executive officer responsible for en-
suring a free and fair election. Thus the secretary of state is involved in the
unique act of balancing the duty to ensure access to the ballot box with protect-
ing the integrity of the voting process.
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Over the past four decades, most developments in voting rights legislation
and case law have focused specifically on the franchise: the right to cast a ballot
and have that ballot tabulated as a vote. These advances, albeit important, have
left underdeveloped the concomitant right to an undiluted count. And if we
seek to ensure the legitimacy and fairness of our electoral system then we must
now turn to protecting this "other voting right" vigorously. Further, we must
do so in a manner that recognizes voting as a duty and that expects the voter to
exert some effort toward fulfilling that duty.
This Essay explores several aspects of protecting the second, equally impor-
tant, right to a protected ballot box. Part I approaches the electoral process
from the vantage point of a secretary of state, responsible for turning theory in-
to practice and administering the law to make the electoral system work suffi-
ciently well on Election Day. Part II explains how the right to vote actually en-
compasses two distinct rights-the right to cast a vote and the right to have
one's ballot untarnished by illegal votes-and that these two rights are often in
tension. Part III discusses how voting is, and always was intended to be, not on-
ly a right but also a civic duty for American citizens, legitimizing certain tasks
and burdens that the voter is obligated to accept to participate in self-
government. Part IV explores some examples from case law regarding chal-
lenges to election measures designed to ensure successful elections. These cases
show efforts to strike a balance between the two rights, and the legal hurdles a
secretary of state often faces when trying to protect the ballot box. Finally, Part
V surveys additional topics relevant to executive decisions taken to protect vot-
ing rights.
I. THE PERSPECTIVE OF A SECRETARY OF STATE
Popular commentary might lead to the perception that the democratic
process somehow self-organizes on Election Day. The reality, however, is that
fulfilling democracy's promise is extremely difficult. There are countless chal-
lenges inherent in a system for choosing representatives in our republic. Some
of these challenges are the natural result of the grand undertaking that is a gen-
eral election, namely accounting for millions of votes cast by geographically
dispersed and imperfect human beings in a system administered by other im-
perfect human beings. Other difficulties arise from the immense power at stake
in an election. Consequently, there are incentives for some to press every ad-
vantage, fair or not, to achieve their desired electoral results. All of these chal-
lenges must be faced squarely and overcome to ensure legitimate elections.
Every state in the Union has a secretary of state who serves in the executive
branch of government as the chief elections officer.' Chief elections officers are
1. Secretaries of state typically are elected. E.g., IND. CONST. art. VI, § 1; OHIO
CONST. art. III, § I. Such secretaries of state are charged with overseeing state elec-
tions. See, e.g., Official Web Site of the Indiana Secretary of State, About the Divi-
sions, http://www.in.gov/sos/2362.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2009); Ohio Secretary
of State, Duties and Responsibilities, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/about/
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charged with administering the law, both through promulgating rules, regula-
tions, and directives, and also through making countless decisions on how to
proceed when reality confounds theory. These principles of due process and
equal protection must be administered on a daily basis to fulfill the Constitu-
tion's promise. The secretary of state is the official in charge of fulfilling these
duties at both the state and federal levels2 and is charged, in a sense, with bal-
ancing the dual voting rights we identify,' thereby ensuring adequate access to a
secure ballot box.
II. Two VOTING RIGHTS, OFTEN IN TENSION
People often speak of the right to vote. But in actuality there are two voting
rights. The first is the electoral franchise: the right to cast a ballot that is tabu-
lated to determine the outcome of elections, a definitive aspect of democratic
regimes. 4 The second is a concomitant right for each voter not to have his le-
gitimate vote diluted or cancelled by an illegal vote. In other words, voters have
the right to measures that protect and safeguard the integrity of the electoral
process and that assure only legitimate votes are counted. The Supreme Court
recognized this interest when it declared that "the right to vote is the right to
participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the
integrity of the democratic system. ' '5 Both rights must be preserved for each
voter to enjoy the optimal impact of his or her voting decision, but preserving
both rights simultaneously often is a challenge.6
Some level of tension remains unavoidable between the two voting rights of
the franchise and ballot integrity. Measures to increase the franchise focus on
removing individual-level barriers to make voting easier or more convenient.
On the other hand, measures to protect legal votes from illegal dilution tend to
dutiesResponsibilities.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Ohio Secretary
of State].
2. See, e.g., Ohio Secretary of State, supra note 1. This still remains true at the federal
level even after the most recent major federal law affecting elections. See Help
America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 254, 116 Stat. 1666, 1694-96 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 15404 (2006)).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live.").
5. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992).
6. It also is possible to characterize these concomitant rights as aspects of one right
as follows: A voter has the right to maximum participation in the electoral system
by casting a ballot that is counted properly and not diminished by the illegal in-
fluence of ineligible votes. The benefit of conceptualizing these two aspects sepa-
rately, however, is that it aids identifying the specific interest served by any given
voting law.
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impose burdens on the individual, such as requiring the voter to obtain photo
identification, to remember to bring such identification to the polls, or to ap-
pear at a certain place at certain times to cast a vote.
The voting system, by necessity, requires a balancing of these somewhat
countervailing interests. The only infallible, yet politically controversial, way to
confirm voter eligibility at any location would be a biometric identification card
that contains not only a current picture and physical address but also a finger-
print or other such unique datum. Each polling location would need a device
that could verify the encoded material, authenticate identities, and cross-
reference them in real time to a database that integrates local, state, and na-
tional voter data. This procedure would establish that the person present at the
polling location: (i) is the person whose name appears on the precinct voting
roll; (2) is eligible to vote; (3) is entitled to vote in the specific precinct; (4) is
not registered to vote at another location or in another state; and (5) has not
cast a vote in another jurisdiction. Short of such a comprehensive measure,
some degree of doubt in the electoral process will persist. But such a technology
would be extremely costly and entail serious privacy implications. At the other
end of the convenience continuum, a person would have three choices for cast-
ing her vote. First, the voter could show up at any polling location to cast a bal-
lot and simply provide her name to the official distributing the ballots or con-
trolling access to a booth. Second, the voter could send her ballot by mail,
perhaps even weeks before an election, much like current absentee balloting
procedures. Finally, the voter could also register her preferences online, again
simply providing her name and other identifying information to the system.
Such a tripartite system would be the easiest, most convenient voting mecha-
nism guaranteeing every qualified voter the opportunity to participate in an
election. But such a system also could be subject to enormous abuse and fraud,
and making voting effortless is not a secretary of state's goal when formulating a
plan for a secure, effective, and efficient election.
Thus, the challenge within any voting system-and the challenge faced by a
secretary of state-reduces to balancing both sides of the voting rights coin.
Burdens on the voting process likely will have a disparate impact on some vot-
ers and may discourage participation. Voting accommodations increase the ease
with which the franchise can be exercised but also may increase the probability
of fraud, which undermines confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.
Normatively speaking, failure to respect either voting right diminishes the le-
gitimacy of an election, in derogation of the political ideal in a democratic
republic.
III. VOTING IS A Civic DUTY, NOT JUST A CIVIL RIGHT
With these two rights in mind, whatever voting system a state adopts, it
should reflect the principle that voting is a civic duty and that the state can ex-
pect patriotic citizens to invest a certain amount of effort toward that duty. Re-
garding the second right we have identified, there is an important public inter-
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est in tabulating only the votes of eligible voters.7 The right to have one's vote
untarnished by fraud is shorn of any inherent worth if it is divorced from the
voter's role as part of the entire electorate. After all, when casting a ballot, a vot-
er is acting as part of the government! The citizen is not acting as a servant or
agent of government but rather as the sovereign authority dictating government
policy.9
Framing voting as a civic duty is particularly evident in the citizenship qua-
lifications mandated by law. Indeed, one of the distinctive attributes of the right
to vote in the United States is that it is reserved only to citizens. This restriction
is significant when analyzing a constitutionally protected right such as voting,
which is "of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional struc-
ture."'" Safeguarding fundamental rights usually applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Strict scrutiny is the general
rule for government actions burdening fundamental rights, 2 and severe bur-
7. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 161o, 1619 (2008) (plurality
opinion).
8. Petition of Kutay, 121 F. Supp. 537, 538 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ("The individual is the
smallest individual unit of government .... ").
9. See Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 11 S.W.2d 1045, 1050 (Mo. 1928) ("The citizen is so-
vereign, and the right to vote is the distinguishing badge of his sovereignty.").
10. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)). It is beyond the scope of this Essay to discuss in depth
which rights are fundamental. There currently is some confusion as to what the
test for defining fundamentality is for constitutional rights. Kenneth A. Klu-
kowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second Amendment Through the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 195, 211-12 (2009). Originally the
test was whether the right was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1973). In later years, the Court appeared to
consider whether the right is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice"
and "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 & n.14 (1968). But, in a more recent case presenting the
question of fundamentality, the Court applied a two-prong test of whether the
right is both deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the American people
and also "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal citations omitted), suggesting a revival of the ear-
lier test with an additional criterion attached to make the test more demanding.
Although it is unclear as to what the proper test is or whether these are varying ar-
ticulations of a single test, Klukowski, supra, at 212, this issue may be clarified in a
case currently pending before the Supreme Court. See Brief for American Civil
Rights Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-1o, McDonald v.
City of Chi., cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009) (No. o8-1521).
11. See Klukowski, supra note lo, at 197.
12. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988). It also should be
noted that strict scrutiny is not the test employed for all burdens on fundamental
rights. Free speech is one example of a fundamental right for which strict scrutiny
applies only to certain types of burdens, with laws regulating speech subject to va-
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dens on participation in the political process often are subjected to that test.13
Nonetheless, the Court has suggested that citizenship is not a suspect classifica-
tion when considering the right to vote.' 4 The Court has elaborated on this con-
cept, holding that certain public functions are properly performed by citizens
and that discrimination based on citizenship in the realm of those public func-
tions are merely subject to rational-basis review.'5 For example, the Court ap-
plied this logic to uphold a New York law that allowed only U.S. citizens to be
police officers. 16 Such reasoning applies at least equally well to voting laws, since
the citizen is participating in a self-governmental act that determines public
policy when voting, which is perhaps the most significant public function a citi-
zen can perform.
The difference in Supreme Court review standards suggests that the right to
vote is somehow distinguished from other civil rights. When applied to laws
that burden fundamental civil rights, the strict scrutiny test is intended to pro-
tect persons as individuals. But perhaps the right to vote, although fundamen-
tal, is of a different genus because it is not only the right of the citizen qua indi-
vidual but also that of the citizen qua constituent element of"We the People."
When the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of a citizenship qu-
alification, it does so based on the rationale that the subject matter at issue in-
volves a person acting "so close to the core of the political process as to make
him a formulator of government policy."17 The contrapositive of this notion is
that citizens are formulators of government policy. If the ultimate determinant
of public policy is the selection of those who wield policymaking power, then,
when exercising their franchise, voters collectively forming the electorate em-
rying levels of scrutiny. Klukowski, supra note lo, at 206 n.17; Kenneth A. Klu-
kowski, Armed by Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 18
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 167, 186-87 (2008). State action involving some
fundamental rights triggers a test that looks nothing at all like strict scrutiny, with
the Establishment Clause being a perfect example. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, In
Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment Clause Train Wreck Involving Leg-
islative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 228-30 (2008) (describing the multi-
faceted framework for laws that allegedly violate the Establishment Clause).
13. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586-87 (2005).
14. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975). This result is significant for two reasons.
First, laws discriminating on the basis of alienage generally are subject to strict
scrutiny because alienage is a suspect class. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
371-72 (1971). Second, equal protection challenges involving fundamental rights
trigger strict scrutiny in their own right. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458. Voting laws in-
volving citizenship entail both of these triggers but are still not subject to this de-
manding test.
15. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294-96 (1978).
16. Id. at 292-93, 297.
17. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (invalidating a Connecticut statute restrict-
ing eligibility for the state bar to citizens).
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body government itself. As participants in the system voting becomes not only a
right of U.S. citizens; it is a duty of citizenship."
Since voting is a right as well as a public duty, a citizen may forfeit the right
to vote if he becomes unfit in the eyes of society to perform his civic function.
For example, the Fourteenth Amendment allows states to disenfranchise con-
victed felons,' 9 expressly allowing that voting rights can be denied to those con-
victed of serious crimes.2" Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Richard-
son v. Ramirez rejects the argument that such disenfranchisement violates the
Equal Protection Clause.2 Felon disenfranchisement is a matter of state policy;
thus, one may expect variance in how states decide the issue. Only two states,
Maine and Vermont, allow incarcerated felons to vote,22 and approximately
18. Petition of Kutay, 121 F. Supp. 537, 538 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (holding that a citizen has a
"duty to collaborate in suffrage and other governmental duties" but also stating
that there is "not yet a duty to vote"); Dysart v. City of St. Louis, ii S.W.2d 1045,
1050 (Mo. 1928) (declaring that the citizen-voter as a sovereign must discharge his
sovereign function and abide by regulations enacted for that purpose).
19. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-55 (1974).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. It should be noted that other countries have dif-
fering views on this question. Canada, for example, recently has held that denying
voting rights to felons violates the fundamental principles of democracy. Sauv6 v.
Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, 2002 SCC 68 (Can.).
21. 418 U.S. at 54-55. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the Equal
Protection Clause, and Section Two includes language allowing for the number of
people represented in congressional districts to be reduced on the basis of exclud-
ing certain criminals, but not other criminals. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4,
§ 2. In Ramirez, petitioners argued that if this latter group of criminals is ex-
empted from the lesser sanction of reduced congressional representation, then
surely the Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted to forbid them from suf-
fering the greater sanction of losing the franchise. 418 U.S. at 43. While examining
the drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment-a discussion beginning with
the caveat that such legislative history should not be afforded unlimited weight in
constitutional interpretation-the Court found one historical item to be disposi-
tive of this case. Id. at 43-52. Each of the former Confederate states only could be
readmitted after it had submitted its proposed new state constitution for congres-
sional approval. Id. at 48-49. At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, twenty-nine states disallowed voting by felons. Id. at 48. As those states
were readmitted separately to the Union by state-specific enabling legislation, that
federal statute expressly permitted those states to disenfranchise felons. See id. at
51-52. Therefore, the Court found that whatever rights were secured by the Equal
Protection Clause, a right against disenfranchisement for felons was not among
them, since Congress contemporaneously and expressly authorized such disen-
franchisement in specific states. Id. at 53-54.
22. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 49 & n.o (3d ed. 2004) (citing Rosanna M. Taormina, Comment, De-
fying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and the "Usual Residence" Principle, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 431, 46o-61 (2003)).
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one-third of the states disallow voting by felons who have completed their sen-
tences. 3
Recently enacted statutes designed to advance voting rights seem to have
focused on expanding the franchise-a worthwhile and laudable objective-but
have not focused enough on protecting the integrity of legal votes. What are
perhaps the two most significant changes in federal voting law in the past twen-
ty years, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,24 and the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), "5 both have facilitated voter registration and the abil-
ity to cast ballots. One looks in vain for recent federal laws that focus on elimi-
nating waste and fraud from the voting process or that stress the constitutional
permissibility of imposing reasonable burdens on voters in fulfilling their civic
duty to participate in democracy. Laws strengthening the integrity of the ballot
box must be pursued with equal vigor. There is a strong government interest in
the stability of electoral systems.26 The electorate's "confidence in the integrity
of the electoral process [is vital] because it encourages citizen participation in
the electoral process."27 The Supreme Court thus has held that "government
23, Id. at 49-5o. For a specific example, see IND. CONST. art. II, § 8.
24. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 197399 (20o6)). The Act had four official purposes:
(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citi-
zens who register to vote in elections for Federal office; (2) to make it
possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act
in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters
in elections for Federal office; (3) to protect the integrity of the electoral
process; and (4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration
rolls are maintained.
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)(1)-(4) (2006). Although these purposes may have been the
official ones enumerated, a sizeable minority in Congress considered it a partisan
measure that would deteriorate ballot box integrity. See H.R. REP. No. 103-9 at 34-
35 (1993). If true, then this statute may have advanced its first two stated objectives
of expanding the franchise but possibly at the expense of the latter two objectives
concerning the right against vote dilution. Most courts seem to have identified the
former interests of increasing the franchise as being the primary objective of the
Act. See, e.g., Harkless v. Blackwell, 467 F. Supp. 2d 754, 763 (N.D. Ohio 2006)
("The purpose of the NVRA is to establish procedures that will increase the num-
ber of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for federal office.").
25. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2006)). HAVA was intended to update and
improve the standards used in voting systems nationwide. See H.R. REP. No. 107-
730, at 1 (2002) (Conf. Rep.). HAVA's providing for the casting of provisional bal-
lots in situations where formerly a person might not be able to vote at all, how-
ever, has the effect of expanding the franchise in a manner that creates the possi-
bility of illegal votes being cast.
26. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366 (1997).
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must play an active role in structuring elections. . . 'if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democ-
ratic process. '
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO SAFEGUARDING THE VOTING PROCESS
When evaluating election laws, courts must be cognizant of the dual guar-
antees of the right to vote and additionally that voting is not solely a right but
also a duty. The right to vote does not entail the right to do so in whatever
manner the voter chooses. 9 States retain the power to regulate elections,3" and
every election law invariably imposes some burden on individual voters." Al-
though invidiously discriminatory laws are offensive to the right to vote, even-
handed measures "that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral proc-
ess" are not invidious and therefore pass constitutional muster.32 Moreover, the
fact that this right is also a duty allows election officials to presume that public-
spirited citizens with due concern for the course of state and national policy
should be willing to satisfy reasonable regulations and shoulder incidental bur-
dens in the fulfillment of their civic duty.
The federal judiciary has examined numerous voting issues over the past
half-century, working both to promote the enfranchisement right and also to
protect against vote dilution via illegitimate ballots. Many early cases dealt with
racial issues, arising from the reality that many election law violations stemmed
from racial discrimination. In those disputes, the courts often were called upon
to vindicate the constitutional rights of American citizens belonging to minority
racial groups.3 So much has been written on the role of law in securing the
franchise generally that little more need be added here. Instead, additional dis-
cussion is needed on which legal measures will help safeguard the democratic
process by only tabulating ballots that are legal votes and which measures are
appropriate in modern America, where past injustices have been to a large ex-
tent remedied.
This Part examines three case studies of how secretaries of state and other
high-ranking election officials grapple with the modern challenges of convert-
27. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 161o, 1620 (2008) (plurality
opinion).
28. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724, 730 (1974)).
29. Id. (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189,193 (1986)).
30. Id. (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 2o8, 217 (1986); Sugar-
man v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
31. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 46o U.S. 78o, 788 n.9 (1983).
32. Id. at 788 n.9 (1983).
33. For example, poll taxes were found to be unconstitutional because of their racial
impact. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685 (1966).
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ing legal theory into democratic reality for election law and voting rights issues.
Section IV.A discusses the recent example of voter-identification laws as one of
the few attempts to safeguard the ballot box and the constitutionality presump-
tion issues that arose in ensuing litigation. Section IV.B considers the issues
arising from timely administration of new federal mandates in state elections.
Finally, Section IV.C deals with the federalism issues posed by the preceding
discussions and argues that a clearer demarcation between federal and state au-
thority may alleviate the burdens posed by federal involvement in state elec-
tions.
A. Constitutional Burden-Shifting
The modern approach in election law litigation seems to be that when
someone brings suit challenging a voting law, there is a de facto presumption
that the law is unconstitutional unless the government can establish a compel-
ling need for even the slightest measure. This quasi-strict scrutiny approach to
voting regulations (even when the court does not actually apply strict scrutiny)
drives much of the conflict in election law, as courts become more skeptical of,
rather than deferential to, the efforts of election officials-especially secretaries
of state-to ensure an orderly and fair election.
The reality is that states have significant authority under the Constitution
to protect legal votes from illegitimate dilution. In 2008, a plurality opinion of
the Supreme Court asserted that if a state's burdens on voting are merely in-
convenient and if its restrictions are nonsevere and nondiscriminatory, those
burdens are evaluated under a much less demanding "important regulatory in-
terests" standard that is deferential to policymakers' judgments.3 4 The Supreme
Court's precedents show that, when assessing the magnitude of the burden that
laws impose on voting rights, it determines how the law applies to the entire
electorate, not just the impact on individual voters with "peculiar circum-
stances."35 Absent discriminatory intent, this proposition holds even where pro-
tected classes are concerned. 6 As a result, it should follow that states need not
provide elaborate empirical verification regarding the significant interests they
purport to uphold through election laws.
3 7
Voter identification laws are excellent examples of statutes designed to pro-
tect the public integrity of the electoral process, and challenges to such laws ap-
pear frequently on the federal docket. A recent bipartisan, blue ribbon commis-
34. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 161o, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992)). The plurality
opinion in Crawford expressly rejected at least some aspects of this proposition.
See id, at 1616 n.8 (plurality opinion).
35. Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 1626.
37. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997) (citation omit-
ted).
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sion concluded that allowing polling officials to confirm the identity of a person
requesting a ballot is imperative for democratic electoral systems." As a step in
the right direction towards respecting state primacy, and in the only photo-
identification case it has decided so far, the Supreme Court found that an Indi-
ana statute did not impose "excessively burdensome requirements" on any type
of voter.3 9 Courts are increasingly willing to uphold these measures as seen in
several recent federal cases.
40
The deference to state authorities present in Crawford is essential for elec-
tion officials, as it allows them to formulate policies that cannot be invalidated
pursuant to the lawsuits that some special interest groups consistently bring
against voting regulations. It shifts the burden of producing empirical evidence
of unconstitutionality to the interest group. If nonsevere measures are pre-
sumptively valid, then the burden should rest with challengers to demonstrate
the measures' flaws rather than on election officials to build an extensive factual
record as a condition precedent to enacting new policies. If courts were to adopt
the same approach as was taken in Crawford, an approach that respects state
primacy, election officials would able to focus on protecting voters' rights rather
than engaging in frivolous lawsuits.
B. The Timeliness and Interpretation of Federal Mandates
Another example of voting rights controversies worth consideration are
those arising from states' attempts to grapple with new federal mandates for
election reform. For example, after the contentious 2000 general election, Con-
gress enacted the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Laws such as HAVA
often generate substantial litigation, as parties disagree over what is permissible
under the new law. Such major federal interventions regarding a government
38. COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM § 2.5, at 18 (2005),
available at http://wwwi.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf ("The elec-
toral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or de-
tect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters. Photo IDs currently are needed to
board a plane, enter federal buildings, and cash a check. Voting is equally impor-
tant.").
39. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (plurality opinion) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724, 738 (1974)). The statute at issue required voters to present proof of identifica-
tion when arriving at the polls to cast a ballot, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-
8-25.1 (LexisNexis 2009), with exemptions for some voters or special circum-
stances, such as elderly voters at seniors' homes casting a ballot at that location, id.
§§ 3-10-1-7.2(e), 3-11-8-25.1(e), 3-11-10-1.2 (LexisNexis 2009).
40. E.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (iith Cir. 2009) (upholding
Georgia's voter identification statute); ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313,
1319 (ioth Cir. 2008) (upholding a municipal law requiring valid photo-
identification); League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 340 F. Supp. 2d 823 (S.D.
Ohio 2004).
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function traditionally within the states' purview generate numerous legal ques-
tions. Many of those disputes unfortunately arise right when elections are ap-
proaching. This imposes an especially onerous burden on secretaries of state,
who must prepare and coordinate with election officials at the county and pre-
cinct level (most of whom are volunteers with limited time to receive amended
instructions) whose duty it is to ensure a successful election system in a timely
fashion.
Courts therefore must be careful when engaging in voting rights controver-
sies so soon before citizens turn out to the polls. Suits brought just before an
election limit the possibility of judicial review, as there are only so many days
before Election Day, and conducting an orderly election takes a great deal of
planning, effort, and coordination. Some courts argue that timing issues should
not impede judicial intervention, even when the regulations challenged were
enacted recently.4 This is unfortunate, as complex and intrusive federal statu-
tory schemes often take significant time to implement correctly at the state
level. The Supreme Court recently has restated in the context of elections that
judicial review of federal laws should be regarded as "the gravest and most deli-
cate duty that this Court is called on to perform." 42 That sentiment is not con-
trolling here because the Court premises it on Congress's status as a "coequal
branch," 43 but it is not inapposite either. "When evaluating a neutral, nondis-
criminatory regulation of voting procedure, [the Court] must keep in mind that
[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representa-
tives of the people. ' 44 The Constitution's specific recognition of states' primacy
in the election process45 implicates federalism concerns that counsel for judicial
restraint.
When election officials such as secretaries of state issue final voting regula-
tions quickly after major legislation like HAVA becomes law, those officials risk
the specter of federal litigation. Such challenges usually are directed against state
41. See, e.g., Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 339 F. Supp. 2d 975
(N.D. Ohio 2004), rev'd in part, 387 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that the
plaintiffs' filing suit just six weeks before the 2004 election was justified because
the challenged directive was issued two months before Election Day).
42. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 25o6 (2009) (here-
inafter NAMUDNO] (quoting Blodgett v. Holen, 275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927)
(Holmes, J., concurring)).
43. Id. (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981)).
44. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parent-
hood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (20o6) (internal quotation marks and oth-
er citations omitted)); see also id. at 1626-27 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is for state
legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits of possible changes to their election
codes, and their judgment must prevail unless it imposes a severe and unjustified
overall burden upon the right to vote, or is intended to disadvantage a particular
class.").
45. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973) (citing various cases).
28:107 2009
THE OTHER VOTING RIGHT
statutes and regulations, which means that they should be filed in state courts.
46
Building on the aforementioned federalism concerns, courts should consider
whether they can effectively adjudicate some matters in the remaining days be-
fore an election. Occasionally, "practical considerations ... require courts to
allow elections to proceed despite pending legal challenges." 47 This is especially
true in light of the franchise's corollary right of a secure and undiluted ballot
box, juxtaposed with the civic duty dimension voting, which expects citizens to
participate even in the face of adverse circumstances.
Take, for example, a district court ruling from Ohio concerning whether
under HAVA provisional ballots must be cast in the same manner as ordinary
ballots, i.e., in the voter's home precinct. HAVA does not define the term "ju-
risdiction" in which a provisional ballot must be cast. The district court rejected
a directive from the Ohio Secretary of State that required a person found not to
be an eligible voter could only cast a provisional ballot in his regular precinct
and decided that "jurisdiction" meant county rather than precinct. 48 The Sixth
Circuit reversed, noting that while the district court cited Senator Dodd's
comments from legislative history defining "jurisdiction" to mean county, Sen-
ator Bond's comments explicitly required the ballot to be cast only in the cor-
rect polling place. 49 The purpose of HAVA is to compensate for local election
officials' lack of "perfect knowledge" regarding individual voters;" it is not to
effectuate widespread removal of state voting requirements. Had the Sixth Cir-
cuit not intervened, such district court decisions, handed down shortly before
Election Day, could result in major disruptions for the election at hand." Bal-
46. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that state courts are "the ultimate ex-
positors of state law." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975).
47. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1985 (2008) (citation omitted). The current ver-
sion of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was adopted in 2006. See Fannie Lou Hamer,
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
48. Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 339 F. Supp. 2d 975, 989-90
(N.D. Ohio 2004).
49. Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 574-75 (quoting 148
CONG. REC. 30 (2002) (statements of Sen. Bond)).
50. Id. at 570 (citation omitted).
51. It is possible that these holdings may not be good law. Standing is a threshold is-
sue, which a court must address before turning to the merits. Lance v. Coffman,
549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens United for a Better Env't, 523
U.S. 83, 102 (1998)). Although the constitutional case-or-controversy elements of
Article III were not at issue in Blackwell, see Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2768
(2008); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992), it is a separate
standing issue to recognize that HAVA § 302 did not expressly authorize a cause
of action. Courts are reluctant to find an implied right of action in statutes. See
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001); cf Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (describing the factors for finding implied rights of action).
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ancing the right to cast a ballot with the right to an orderly and secure voting
process can naturally lead to the conclusion that requiring a voter to cast his
provisional ballot in his local precinct is an appropriate policy. Courts should
consider the appropriateness and timeliness of their interventions before ven-
turing into the litigation that often accompanies states' interpretations of com-
plex federal election mandates.
C. Federalism and Conflicts ofAuthority
As American society continually aspires to its constitutional ideals, the bal-
ance between protecting voting rights through federal law and respecting state
authority to regulate elections has shifted. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)
is an example of federal involvement regarding the right to vote that was en-
acted in response to an environment far removed from the United States of the
present day. The Act was passed with an intense focus on expanding the fran-
chise, specifically to give effect to the plain language of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. The law permitted previously unprecedented federal interference and
oversight into state election practices and was passed to address the most egre-
gious violations of voting rights taking place in America at the time, largely
driven by racial prejudice.52 While seeking to address racial injustice, the VRA is
a textbook illustration of the federal focus on expanding voting rights without
sufficient regard for the "other" right at the heart of this Essay.
Thus, when federal law attempts to preempt state election law, the judiciary
should examine such laws carefully to avoid unduly privileging the first right
(franchise) while ignoring the second (protecting ballot integrity). Federal au-
thority with respect to election law in particular should be approached cau-
tiously, and recent cases suggest a new respect for state authority in elections is
returning to the judiciary. For example, the Court has signaled that VRA § 5
The district court rejected the argument that HAVA § 302-concerning provi-
sional ballots-creates no private right of action to bring a § 1983 civil rights suit,
holding instead that the plaintiffs had standing. Blackwell, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 986-
87. This part of the district court's holding was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.
Blackwell, 387 F.3d at 572-73. In another lawsuit four years later, however, the Su-
preme Court reviewed a controversy in Ohio concerning HAVA
§ 303, vacating the Sixth Circuit on a preliminary matter. The Court justified its
decision on the ground that it was unlikely that the plaintiffs could establish a
right of action if the Court were to call for briefing and argument in the case
(which it did not, as the case became moot shortly thereafter). Brunner v. Ohio
Republican Party, 129 S. Ct. 5, 6 (2008) (granting stay and vacating temporary re-
straining order, citing probable lack of standing). Had the Supreme Court consid-
ered the Blackwell case, perhaps the Court would have dismissed it for lack of
standing. Even so, the Court's later holding in the subsequent Brunner case at least
casts doubt on whether a suit could be brought under § 302, a doubt that cannot
be resolved until an appellant properly requests relief under that HAVA provi-
sion.
52. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
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may not survive future constitutional challenges. Specifically, § 5, which re-
quires that states submit their election and districting proposals for federal ap-
proval, may be overly intrusive in light of contemporary political realities. In
short, the racial hostilities prevalent when the VRA was enacted no longer jus-
tify such intrusion.53 Additionally, an Ohio district court rejected the argument
that a statute such as HAVA cannot preempt state law in regulating matters in-
cidental to federal elections54 based on the Supremacy Clause and upon general
rules regarding preemption.
5
While the Ohio case and the Supreme Court's leanings with respect to the
VRA represent a partially restored respect for states' roles in election, they still
fail to meet the actual constitutional standard. Unlike cases giving rise to gen-
eral pronouncements of federal preeminence, the Constitution specifically ad-
dresses federal-state interaction vis-A-vis elections. Article I, § 4 specifically
states that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature the-
reof..... ."I6 It is true that the same clause then continues, "but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations ... ."I' That a specific
constitutional provision exists should require further judicial explication on
this issue, given that this clause appears to balance some degree of sovereign au-
tonomy concerning the conduct of elections."
The fact that Congress has constitutional authority to override state policy
judgments does not automatically lead to the conclusion that general principles
of preemption apply. A clearer rule demarcating the appropriate interaction of
the two aforementioned constitutional provisions in the current statutory re-
gime would be helpful. In some contexts, such preemption has only occurred
where congressional intent to override state law is clear and unambiguous. 9
Courts must establish a clear rule that upholds the constitutionally established
role of states in the administration of elections, attempting to reconcile a state's
53. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 25104, 2510-14 (2009).
54. 339 F. Supp. 2d 975, 989 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
55. Id. (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74 (2000)).
56. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 568 (6th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)) ("The States long
have been primarily responsible for regulating federal, state, and local elections.
These regulations have covered a range of issues, from registration requirements
to eligibility requirements to ballot requirements to vote-counting require-
ments.").
59. Cf United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (discussing preemption in a
criminal law context); Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261,
275 (1943) (highlighting preemption concerns in refusing to strike down a state
regulation affecting the award of government contracts).
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goal in conducting free and fair elections with meeting the demands of federal
regulation, especially when those federal demands give too little weight to the
right to ballot box integrity.
V. ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY To AVOID DILUTION OF LEGAL VOTES
Although it is beyond the scope of this Essay, applications of these voting
rights principles should affect how the decennial census is conducted. The cen-
tral role that the census plays in determining political representation inextrica-
bly links it to voting rights. The Constitution requires a national census to be
conducted once per decade,6" and this mandate serves as the basis for appor-
tioning seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. 6' For each state, the number
of people in each constituent congressional district must be precisely equal.62
This directive holds true for state legislative seats as well, except that some de-
gree of variation in district population is constitutionally acceptable.6 3 Given
that the census in part apportions political representation and that the State
may exclude aliens from the formal political community,6 4 it seems relevant for
census forms to ask whether a person being counted is an alien, especially an
illegal alien.6"
At this point, it is essential to distinguish census counts for purposes of po-
litical representation from population counts for federal funding or other non-
representational functions. Note, for example, that Native Americans not sub-
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
61. Id.
62. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1983); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526, 530-31 (1969).
63. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320-25 (1973); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (noting that the overriding objective of the state in creating
districts "must be substantial equality of population"). This state-level require-
ment exists despite the fact that requiring state senate districts be drawn in the
same manner as state house districts seems inconsistent with a number of princi-
ples regarding the different purposes that senates serve.
64. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973).
65. The relevance of whether an alien is present legally in the country stems from
considering the policy judgments of Congress. The Constitution vests Congress
with plenary authority over immigration and naturalization. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 4. If an alien is a legal resident, then, at a minimum, Congress has offi-
cially welcomed that person into this country. Insofar as federal aid and entitle-
ments are impacted by population, then counting a legal alien gives effect to rec-
ognizing Congress's right to bring noncitizens into the country. But an illegal
alien may be excluded from the national community and should, as a normative
matter, have no claim to political representation or government largesse. But see
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224-26 (1982) (5-4 decision) (holding that denying the
children of illegal aliens a public school education violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
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ject to taxation are expressly excluded from the U.S. census for purposes of
congressional representation.66 And the Court has noticed that the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended that congressional redistricting should
not take account of convicted felons who could not vote.6 7 This limitation em-
phasizes a focus on counting members of the electorate, not imposing addi-
tional penalties for past crimes. A logical extension of that rationale would ex-
clude aliens or, at least illegal aliens, in counts used for redistricting and
reapportionment of state and federal legislative districts.
CONCLUSION
The issue of voting rights has reached a new turning point in United States
history. After decades of efforts to expand the franchise and ensure that voters
have an opportunity to cast ballots, legislatures and the courts are poised to re-
focus on the concomitant right not to have a legal vote diluted or cancelled by
illegitimate ballots. This second right, advanced by measures to protect the in-
tegrity of the ballot box and build public confidence in the electoral system,
works with the franchise to realize the best principles underlying the American
experiment in popular government that gives life to our democratic republic.
Executive officials hold their offices to serve the American people and faith-
fully perform their duties. In the arena of elections those duties are performed
at the state level, by a secretary of state and others accountable for implement-
ing the Secretary's plan for conducting elections. Secretaries of state aim to en-
sure that the voting process is accessible to voters and also work to secure the
ballot box by combating fraud and waste. Elections must be conducted in an
orderly fashion; systems that recognize reasonable burdens on the franchise are
perfectly acceptable. For voting is a duty, and the citizen wishing to participate
should also be willing to satisfy reasonable criteria to guarantee a free and fair
election that validly reflects the choice of the electorate.
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
67. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 45-46 (1974).
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